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THE SUPREME COURT AND RACIAL PROGRESS*
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY**
The Supreme Court has had a dismal record on issues of race throughout
American history. The Court enforced the institution of slavery, upheld
“separate but equal,” and consistently failed to deal with systemic racism and
racial inequalities. The current Court is the most conservative since the mid1930s and is unlikely to advance racial equality. Quite the contrary, it is likely
to impose restrictions on what governments can do to advance racial equality.
But there remains hope for positive change through other institutions, such as
state constitutions, state courts, and the political process at all levels of
government.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has been a dismal failure in dealing with issues of race
throughout American history.1 I fear that the foreseeable future with six
conservative justices offers little basis for believing that the Court will be a force
for racial justice. Indeed, I see a likelihood in the immediate future of just the
opposite. However, I am hopeful that other institutions can, and will, act. The
racial reckoning in the United States that began last May after the tragic death
of George Floyd saw protests for racial justice in all fifty states.2 I am very
hopeful that they will be the impetus for real change.
It is understandable why so many people look to the Supreme Court to
advance racial justice because the political process has often failed.3 Americans
want the Court to give meaning to the majestic language of the Declaration of
Independence and to the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. We take
heart and encouragement from when this occurred, most notably from cases like
Brown v. Board of Education.4 We know to a certainty that elected Southern
legislators and judges would not have ended segregation in 1954, or for a long
time after, without the Court giving meaning to such guarantees.5
Today, legislators and elected officials are still systematically
disenfranchising minority voters.6 Americans expect the judiciary to enforce the
1. I develop this point in ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT
21–53 (2014) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT]. See generally
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, PRESUMED GUILTY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT EMPOWERED THE
POLICE AND SUBVERTED CIVIL RIGHTS (2021) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY, PRESUMED GUILTY]
(describing the Supreme Court’s history concerning race and policing).
2. Janie Haseman, Karina Zaiets, Mitchell Thorson, Carlie Procell, George Petras & J.
Sullivan, Tracking Protests Across the USA in the Wake of George Floyd’s Death, USA TODAY (June 3,
2020, 7:47 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/graphics/2020/06/03/map-protests-wake-george
-floyds-death/5310149002/ [https://perma.cc/7VW9-EQN7].
3. The reality is that the political process failed to eliminate slavery, created and maintained Jim
Crow laws, failed to control racialized policing, and historically and now has adopted laws with the
purpose and effect of disenfranchising voters of color. See Abril Castro, Connor Maxwell & Danyelle
Solomon, Systemic Inequality and American Democracy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.americanprogress.org/article/systematic-inequality-american-democracy/ [https://perma.
cc/JU93-SWVZ]; CHEMERINSKY, PRESUMED GUILTY, supra note 1, at ch. 3 (explaining the failure
of the political process to regulate racist policing); see Voting Laws Roundup, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Oct. 4, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-octo
ber-2021 [https://perma.cc/6NNJ-9L4J] (listing restrictive voting laws that disproportionately burden
voters of color).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. See The Southern Manifesto and “Massive Resistance” to Brown, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC.
FUND, https://www.naacpldf.org/ldf-celebrates-60th-anniversary-brown-v-board-education/southernmanifesto-massive-resistance-brown/ [https://perma.cc/B8F6-CESN].
6. For example, in 2021, nineteen states adopted laws to restrict voting. See Voting Laws Roundup,
supra note 3.
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Constitution and move our society towards greater equality. This Article
addresses three questions. Looking back and looking across time and issues, Part
I asks and then analyzes how the Supreme Court has done regarding racial
justice. Part II explores what we can expect to see from the Court in the
foreseeable future. And perhaps most importantly, Part III explores the answer
to the question of who will pursue advances in racial justice if not the Court and
provides suggested institutions to fulfill this role.
I. ASSESSING THE SUPREME COURT’S RECORD ON RACIAL ISSUES
Looking back across time and issues, the Supreme Court has a terrible
record concerning race and ending discrimination. This part provides a
summary of such failed record. Though the Court’s failure to end racial
discrimination is familiar to most, it is important to view the Court’s record in
light of American history. Simply put, the sum is much worse than the parts.
A.

Pre-Civil War

From 1787 until the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, a
period of seventy-eight years, the Court did nothing to further abolition.
During this time period, the Court upheld the institution of slavery by
protecting slave owners. For example, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,7 in 1842, the
Court enforced the Fugitive Slave Clause and declared unconstitutional a state
law that prohibited removing an escaped slave in Pennsylvania by force or
violence.8 We celebrate Justice Joseph Story as one of the greatest jurists in
Supreme Court history, but we cannot do that unless we overlook his tragically
wrong decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.
In Dred Scott v. Sanford,9 in 1857, the Supreme Court held that slaves are
pieces of property, not citizens, even if they are born in the United States.10 The
Supreme Court declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional because it
was an impermissible taking of property of slaves from their owners.11 The
Court should not be excused for these abhorrent decisions because the Court
could have—and should have—done much better in bringing about the end of
slavery. It certainly could have upheld laws like Pennsylvania’s that protected
fugitive slaves and it could have upheld the Missouri Compromise.12 At the very
7. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (enslaved person at issue).
8. Id. at 539–43.
9. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (enslaved party), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
10. Id. at 393–94.
11. Id. at 395–96.
12. In reality, the Supreme Court struck down state laws designed to protect escaped slaves. For
example, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the Court held that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 preempted
Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law, which criminalized the kidnapping of escaped slaves. 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) at 625–26.
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least, it could have handed down decisions that undermined, rather than
continually upheld, slavery.
B.

“Separate but Equal”

From 1896 to 1954, the Supreme Court articulated and enforced
apartheid—the doctrine of separate but equal—which of course was separate
and always unequal. The Supreme Court enforced the Jim Crow laws that
segregated every aspect of life in southern states and many border states. In
1896, Plessy v. Ferguson13 famously upheld separate but equal.14 But we should
not forget the cases that followed Plessy. In Cumming v. Board of Education,15 in
1899, the Supreme Court held that the government could maintain a whitesonly high school when no high school was available for Black students.16 In Berea
College v. Kentucky,17 in 1908, the Court held that Kentucky could prohibit a
private college from admitting Black students.18 In Gong Lum v. Rice,19 in 1927,
the Court ruled that Mississippi could exclude Chinese students from white
schools.20
C.

The Warren Court

For fifty-eight years, the Warren Court aggressively upheld Jim Crow
laws despite being the model for advancing racial equality. The Warren Court
was far superior to the courts that preceded and followed it, but on reflection,
it is arguably less admirable than it seems. Even still, the importance of the
Warren Court’s efforts should not be entirely deprecated. It did finally overrule
Plessy.21 It also struck down the laws that created apartheid in every aspect of
life, but there are some other aspects of the Warren Court that should not be
overlooked.
First, Brown itself was written narrowly, and the Court never explained
why segregation was inconsistent with equal protection. Chief Justice Warren’s
opinion focused solely on how separate schools hurt the education of Black
children.22 What the Court did not explain was why segregation was
13. 163 U.S. 537.
14. Id. at 537–38.
15. 175 U.S. 528.
16. Id. at 528–29.
17. 211 U.S. 45.
18. Id. at 45–46.
19. 275 U.S. 78.
20. Id. at 78.
21. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954).
22. Id. at 494 (“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A
sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law,
therefore, has a tendency to (retard) the educational and mental development of negro children and to
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inconsistent with the very essence of equal protection under the Constitution.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court struck down other laws opposing segregation
without issuing opinions. For example, in Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
City v. Dawson,23 the Supreme Court, in a memorandum disposition without an
opinion, affirmed a lower court decision declaring unconstitutional a law
requiring segregation in the use of public beaches and bathhouses.24 The Court
did the same thing in Holmes v. City of Atlanta25 by declaring segregation of
municipal golf courses unconstitutional;26 in Gayle v. Browder27 by declaring the
segregation of a municipal bus system unconstitutional;28 in Johnson v. Virginia29
by declaring segregation of courtroom seating unconstitutional;30 and in Turner
v. City of Memphis31 by declaring segregation of public restaurants
unconstitutional.32
But the Supreme Court never wrote an opinion explaining that equal
protection is inherently meant to repudiate the idea of subordination of race.
Laws requiring segregation are based on that subordination. They were
explicitly based on the superiority of one race and the inferiority of another.
There never was an illusion that separate was equal. The Court could have and
should have said this explicitly.
Second, even in education, Brown did little to bring about equality or end
segregation in reality. When Brown was decided on May 17, 1954, it did not
indicate the remedies to be imposed to end segregated schools. The Court had
the case reargued the next year on the question of remedies. And then in Brown
II,33 the Court did not impose timetables for achieving desegregation or outline
the steps to be taken.34 Instead, the Supreme Court told the lower courts to
bring about desegregation with “all deliberate speed.”35 As I always tell my
students, the phrase “all deliberate speed,”36 is an oxymoron. Many years later,
Justice John Paul Stevens said that he believed that the Court made a mistake
in choosing unanimity over imposing a remedy for segregation.37 The result was
deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial(ly) integrated school system.”
(quoting Findings of Fact ¶ 8, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951) (No. T-316))).
23. 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (mem.) (per curiam).
24. Id.
25. 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (mem.) (per curiam).
26. Id. at 879.
27. 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (mem.) (per curiam).
28. Id. at 903.
29. 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam).
30. Id. at 61–62.
31. 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam).
32. Id. at 351–54.
33. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
34. See id. at 301.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 100–01 (2011).
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that in the South in 1964—a decade after Brown—just 1.2% of Black school
children were attending school with white school children.38 In South Carolina,
Alabama, and Mississippi, not one Black child attended a public school with a
white child during the 1962–1963 school year.39 In North Carolina, only onefifth of one percent—or 0.026%—of Black students attended desegregated
schools in 1961, and the figure did not rise above one percent until 1965.40
Similarly, in Virginia in 1964, only 1.63% of Blacks were attending desegregated
schools.41
Third, it is often forgotten that it was the Warren Court that was
responsible for greatly expanding racialized policing in Terry v. Ohio42 in 1968.43
In Terry, the Supreme Court held that the police could stop and search
individuals without probable cause.44 The Supreme Court said that only
“reasonable suspicion” was required.45 To this day, the Supreme Court has
never defined what is enough for reasonable suspicion. As recently as 2020, the
Supreme Court has said only that it is more than a hunch, but less than probable
cause.46 But study after study has shown how the relaxed and ambiguous
standard of reasonable suspicion has fostered racialized policing.47 Terry has
made it too easy for police to stop individuals solely for being Black or Brown.
Statistics in every major jurisdiction—whether it’s where I live in California or
North Carolina, where this Article is being published—show that Black and
Brown people are disproportionately stopped and frisked by the police.48 This
was entirely foreseeable in 1968. At the time, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
wrote a stunning brief to the Supreme Court explaining how adopting a
standard like reasonable suspicion would reinforce and expand racialized
policing.49 It stated: “The evidence is weighty and uncontradicted that stop and
frisk power is employed by the police most frequently against the inhabitants
of our inner cities, racial minorities and the underprivileged.”50

38. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 9
(1994).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 392 U.S. 1.
43. See CHEMERINSKY, PRESUMED GUILTY, supra note 1, at 93 (detailing how the Warren Court
expanded police power).
44. Terry, 392 U.S. at 2–3.
45. Id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020).
47. See CHEMERINSKY, PRESUMED GUILTY, supra note 1, at 62–63 (describing studies showing
racial disparities in police stops).
48. Id.
49. Brief for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 3, Sibron v.
New York, 932 U.S. 40 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74, 67).
50. Id.
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Terry v. Ohio was an eight-to-one decision.51 Only Justice William O.
Douglas dissented.52 It came down from the most liberal Supreme Court we
have ever had in American history. The majority opinion was written by Chief
Justice Earl Warren,53 the author of Brown v. Board of Education.54 The majority
included, among others, liberal giants William Brennan and Thurgood
Marshall.55 It is interesting to speculate why the Warren Court handed down a
decision like this. In part, the Supreme Court may have been reacting to the
intense criticism of its other decisions protecting criminal defendants in the
1960s, such as Mapp v. Ohio56 and Miranda v. Arizona.57 The Court likely did
not want to be seen as further limiting the police in investigating and preventing
crime.
It also must be remembered that Terry was decided in 1968 during a time
when there were many riots in major cities58: Los Angeles, Detroit, Newark,
Chicago, and many others.59 It was a time when there was great concern over
crime control. As we applaud the Warren Court for all that it did, we must not
forget Terry and its tragic effects as to how policing is done in the United States.
The Warren Court did more to advance racial justice than any other Court
in history and more than all of the Courts that preceded it combined. But it is
also striking that the political reaction against the Warren Court led to its
decision in Terry that furthered racialized policing in the United States.
D.

The Burger Court

The Burger Court that followed the Warren Court had a devastating effect
on many key aspects of racial equality. In the area of public schools, the
combination of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,60 in 1973,
and Milliken v. Bradley,61 in 1974, effectively institutionalized separate and
unequal schools in virtually every metropolitan area in the United States.
51. 392 U.S. 1, 1 (1968).
52. Id. at 35.
53. Id. at 4.
54. 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954).
55. Terry, 392 U.S. at 4.
56. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the states).
57. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58. See Tears of America: The Riots of 1968, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES (July 25, 2018), https://artsand
culture.google.com/exhibit/tears-of-america-the-riots-of-1968-u-s-national-archives/AQKiS4WGYdt
MJg?hl=en [https://perma.cc/5A3P-VRRM].
59. See generally NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968) (discussing the riots that occurred during the
1960s, and concluded that “[o]ur nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate
and unequal"). See also Dylan Matthews, How Today’s Protests Compare to 1968, Explained by a Historian,
VOX (June 2, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://vox.com/identities/2020/6/2/21277253/george-floyd-protest1960s-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/ND4E-QD9A].
60. 411 U.S. 1.
61. 418 U.S. 717.
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Rodriguez was a challenge to the Texas system of funding public schools,
which was largely done through local property taxes.62 The result was that poor
areas had to tax at a high rate of assessed valuation but still had relatively little
to spend on schools.63 Wealthy areas with large property tax bases could tax at
a low rate of assessed valuation and had far more to spend on schools.64 Even in
a single metropolitan area like San Antonio where there were many different
school districts, there was a huge disparity in funding for education.65 I grew up
in Chicago. I went to Chicago Public Schools and the difference in the funding
then and now between, say, the Chicago Public Schools and the suburban New
Trier and the Glenbrook Public Schools is dramatic.66 But the Supreme Court
in a five-to-four decision upheld the Texas system for funding schools.67
Justice Lewis Powell who had been appointed by President Richard Nixon,
wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Warren Burger, Harry
Blackmun, and William Rehnquist—all of whom had been appointed by
Nixon—and also by Potter Stewart, who had been appointed by President
Dwight Eisenhower.68 Justice Powell’s majority opinion said that education is
not a fundamental right under the Constitution.69 He said that education is not
explicitly mentioned and it is not implicitly protected.70 The Court also said
that poverty is not a suspect classification so that discrimination against the
poor gets only rational basis review.71 This, I think, is one of the most tragically
wrong Supreme Court decisions in all of American history. If ever the United
States will be a more equal society, it must be through education. The Court’s
decision that education is not a fundamental right and that poverty is not a
suspect classification dramatically limited the powers of the courts to be a force
for equality in society.
A year later, the Court decided Milliken v. Bradley.72 The case arose in the
Detroit area and it was an attempt by the federal court to desegregate its public
schools.73 Detroit, like cities throughout the country, was a city that was
predominantly minority students surrounded by suburbs that were
62. Rodriguez, 411 U.S at 4–6.
63. Id. at 6–16.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 11–14.
66. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES (1991) (describing the differences
in funding of schools).
67. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 2–3.
68. Id. at 4; see also Supreme Court Nominations (1789-Present), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.
gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.html [https://perma.cc/P4QN-7
DBQ].
69. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 25.
72. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
73. Id. at 717.
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predominantly white students.74 The federal judge formulated a desegregation
plan that would involve taking some of the students from the white suburbs and
bringing them into the city and taking some from the city and moving them to
the suburbs.75 The Supreme Court, again in a five-to-four decision and with the
four Nixon appointees in the majority, held that there generally cannot be such
interdistrict remedies for segregation.76 In other words, desegregation orders
generally cannot cross school district lines. But with most cities having public
schools that are eighty to ninety percent students of color, there were not
enough white students to achieve desegregation.
These two cases resulted in city schools serving predominately students of
color having far less to spend on education compared to predominately white,
suburban schools. These two cases institutionalized and exacerbated the
separate and unequal schools that continue to exist to this day.
The second set of tragic decisions from the Burger Court regarding race
concerned the requirement for proof of discriminatory intent. In Washington v.
Davis,77 in 1976, the Supreme Court held that equal protection violations require
proof that the government acted with the intent to discriminate.78 The case
involved a Washington D.C. requirement that in order to be a police officer, an
individual had to pass a test.79 Statistics showed that Black Americans failed the
test significantly more often than whites and a constitutional challenge was
brought.80 But the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Byron White, held
that equal protection is meant to deal with purposeful discrimination.81
Discriminatory impact is not enough to prove race discrimination.82 In fact,
discriminatory impact isn’t enough to trigger more than rational basis review;
it is not enough to shift the burden of proof to the government to demonstrate
that there is a nonracial justification for its actions.83
The Court has continually reaffirmed the need for proof of discriminatory
intent to demonstrate a racial classification. For example, in McCleskey v.
Kemp,84 the Supreme Court said that proof of a racially disparate impact in
imposing the death penalty was not enough to prove an equal protection
violation.85 The Court found that unless it could be shown in Georgia, where
74. See id. at 739 (discussing how Detroit is “overwhelmingly black” and surrounded by suburbs
which are “overwhelmingly white”).
75. Id. at 717–18.
76. Id. at 720, 752.
77. 426 U.S. 229.
78. Id. at 239–45.
79. Id. at 234.
80. Id. at 235.
81. Id. at 231, 240–41.
82. Id. at 240–41.
83. Id. at 242.
84. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
85. Id. at 291–99.
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the case arose, that the legislature adopted the death penalty for a
discriminatory purpose, or that the particular jury had a discriminatory intent,
there was no basis for finding a constitutional violation.86 In Mobile v. Bolden,87
the Supreme Court said that proof of a discriminatory impact with regard to an
election scheme is not enough to establish a violation of the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendments.88 The importance of these decisions in limiting the
reach of equal protection cannot be overstated.
The Burger Court also made it very difficult to prove discriminatory
intent. In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,89 the Supreme Court
held that it is not enough to show that the government acted with knowledge
that there would be a discriminatory impact.90 It must be proven that the
government took the action with the desire to bring about the discriminatory
result.91 In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.,92 the Court identified very limited ways in which there could be evidence
to prove discriminatory intent.93 These decisions greatly narrowed the reach of
equal protection and the ability of courts at any level of government to remedy
the racial discrimination that exists.
When we think of the Burger Court and race, we often focus on
affirmative action which at that time appeared to offer a triumph for racial
justice. In 1978, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,94 the Supreme
Court, in a splintered five-to-four decision, upheld the ability of colleges and
universities to engage in affirmative action.95 Subsequent cases like Grutter v.
Bollinger96 and Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II)97 have reaffirmed
that diversity in higher education is a compelling government interest and that
colleges and universities may use race as one factor among many in admissions
decisions.98
However, Bakke was less of a victory than it may seem. Bakke held that
affirmative action is permissible only for the sake of enhancing diversity. The
86. Id. at 292–99.
87. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
88. Id. at 70.
89. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
90. Id. at 278–80.
91. Id. at 279 (“‘Discriminatory purpose,’ however, implies more than intent as volition or intent
as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.” (citation omitted)).
92. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
93. Id. at 266–68.
94. 438 U.S. 265.
95. Id. at 267–72.
96. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
97. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
98. Id. at 2210; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
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Court rejected then and has ever since rejected what affirmative action is really
about: remedying the long history of discrimination and ensuring equal
opportunity and an equal playing field.99 When the Court says that affirmative
action is allowed only for the sake of diversity, is it not really saying that
affirmative action is allowed because it benefits white students who are able to
learn in a diverse classroom?100 Doesn’t the Court then set up the criticism that
later came from Justice Clarence Thomas that it is really an aesthetic, that it
makes us feel better to look out at a classroom with a diversity of faces that are
there?101 I do not mean to lessen the importance of diversity in the classroom. I
have been a law professor for forty-one years. I have taught courses like
constitutional law and criminal procedure in classrooms that are almost all white
and in classrooms with a significant number of students of color. The education
for all students is better when there is diversity. But I think that the Court made
a serious mistake in rejecting what affirmative action is really about—righting
the wrongs of a long history of deeply embedded racism—and focusing just on
diversity.
E.

The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts

The Rehnquist and the Roberts Courts have continued down the path
begun by the Burger Court. In many ways, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts
have set back the quest for racial justice. I will mention just a few quickly. First,
the Rehnquist and the Robert Courts have limited the ability of the government
to deal with school segregation. For example, in Board of Education v. Dowell,102
in 1991, the Supreme Court said that effective desegregation orders must end
once they succeed.103 In other words, an effective desegregation order in the
public schools has to cease as soon as it’s achieved, even though ending the court
order will mean the resegregation of public schools. In 2007, the Supreme Court
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1104 said that
99. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 267–68 (1986) (rejecting remedying
historical discrimination as a sufficient justification for affirmative action).
100. See Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on White
Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 426 (2014) (“[T]he diversity rationale does not promote
progressive thinking about race and identity. Rather, it perpetuates an old story—a story about using
black and brown bodies for white purposes on white terms, a story about the expendability of those
bodies once they are no longer needed.”); see also Leah Shafer, The Case for Affirmative Action, HARV.
GRADUATE SCH. EDUC. (July 11, 2018), https://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/uk/18/07/caseaffirmative-action [https://perma.cc/4RAM-PKZW] (positing that by rarely mentioning issues of
inequality out of a fear of incurring legal liability, colleges are engaging in a “diversity bargain,” in
which “white students see the purpose of affirmative action as to benefit them, through a diverse
learning environment”).
101. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. 498 U.S. 237.
103. Id. at 238.
104. 551 U.S. 701.
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public school boards for K-12 cannot use race as a factor in assigning students
to schools unless they meet strict scrutiny.105 Chief Justice Roberts wrote the
opinion for the Court and concluded his opinion by saying “[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race.”106 He emphasized his view that the Constitution requires the government
to be colorblind. The effect of these and other cases from the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts means that our public-school systems are ever more
segregated.107
1. Racialized Policing
A second effect of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts is that they further
empowered racialized policing.108 For one example, consider Whren v. United
States109 in 1996.
On the night of June 10, 1993, plainclothes vice-squad officers of the
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department were patrolling what the
Court called a “high drug area” of the city in an unmarked car.110 The Court said
that the officers’ suspicions were aroused when they passed a dark Pathfinder
truck with temporary license plates and youthful occupants waiting at a stop
sign.111 The driver was looking down into the lap of the passenger at his right.112
What made the police officers suspicious? The Court said that the “truck
remained stopped at the intersection for what seemed an unusually long time—
more than 20 seconds.”113
The unmarked police car made a U-turn to follow the truck, only for the
truck to turn right without signaling.114 The police pulled up to the car and the
officers directed the car to stop.115 The officers then looked into the car and saw
two plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine.116 The defendants were
charged with drug possession and moved to have the evidence excluded.117 The
defendants argued that the officer’s grounds for stopping the vehicle—“to give

105. Id. at 702.
106. Id. at 748.
107. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation & Resegregation of American Public Education: The
Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1620–21 (2003).
108. See CHEMERINSKY, PRESUMED GUILTY, supra note 1, at 210 (“[T]he Supreme Court has
contributed enormously to the problem of policing, and race-based policing in the United States.”).
109. 517 U.S. 806.
110. Id. at 808.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 808–09.
117. Id. at 809.
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the driver a warning concerning traffic violations”—was pretextual.118
Undercover officers in D.C. were not allowed to enforce traffic laws.119 The
defendants argued that the stop was entirely to enforce drug laws, but there was
no reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause, to justify a stop for that
crime.120 Stopping the car because of a minor traffic violation obviously was just
an excuse by the police to look for drugs.
The Court recognized that “[t]emporary detention of individuals during
the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for
a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’” under the Fourth
Amendment.121 Therefore, the Court said it was clearly established that the
Constitution requires an automobile stop to be reasonable under the
circumstances.122 What is required for this? The Court said that “the decision
to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to
believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”123 The Court said that there was
probable cause for the stop in this case: the police observed the car break a traffic
law by turning without a signal.124
The traffic stop in this case clearly was a pretext; the officers had no
authority to enforce traffic laws and no interest in doing so. The Court said that
did not matter.125 The actual motivation of the officers is irrelevant.126 So long
as the officer had probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion, that a traffic law
had been violated, the officer could stop the vehicle.127
Practically speaking, this decision empowers the police to stop anyone at
any time. If police officers follow anyone long enough, they will observe a driver
changing lanes or making a turn without a signal, or the car exceeding the speed
limit by a mile or two an hour, or—and this is the easiest for the police officer—
the car not stopping long enough, or too long, at a stop sign. With the Court’s
holding in Whren, it is now completely irrelevant for Fourth Amendment
purposes that the officer’s actual motivation for the stop had nothing to do with
traffic enforcement.
Once the car is pulled over, the police can order the driver and the
passenger out of the car.128 The police can then search the passenger
118. Id.
119. Id. at 815.
120. Id. at 809.
121. Id. at 809–10.
122. Id. at 810.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 813.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 806.
128. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 106 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that police can order
driver out of the car when there has been a traffic stop); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 408 (1997)
(holding that police can order passengers out of the car).
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compartment of the car, including all containers within it.129 The Court
explained that this is to protect the officers and to be sure that there is not a
weapon that the individual might reach.130 The result is that the police can stop
and search virtually anyone, almost any time they want. And this power is
inevitably used in a racially discriminatory manner.
2. Racial Discrimination in Voting
A final example concerning civil rights in the Rehnquist and the Roberts
Courts is how they struck down crucial civil rights laws. In 2013, Shelby County
v. Holder131 was the first time that the Court struck down a civil rights law since
the nineteenth century.132
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits voting practices or procedures
that discriminate on the basis of race or against certain language minority
groups.133 Under the 1982 amendments to Section 2, the Act is violated when
state or local laws have the effect of disadvantaging minority voters.134 Lawsuits
can be brought to challenge state or local actions that are alleged to violate
Section 2.135
But Congress, in adopting the Voting Rights Act, concluded that allowing
lawsuits to challenge election procedures was not adequate to stop
discrimination in voting.136 Such litigation is expensive and time consuming.137
Congress was also aware that Southern states often invented new ways of
disenfranchising minority voters. The arcade game “whack-a-mole” is an apt
analogy to what went on in many states. A law would be adopted to limit voting
by racial minorities; it would be challenged and struck down, only to be replaced

129. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 454 (1981). Subsequently, the Court said that this ability
to search the car does not apply to situations where the car was already pulled over before the officer
approached it and where the driver and passenger were not near the vehicle. See Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332, 343 (2009).
130. Belton, 453 U.S. at 457.
131. 570 U.S. 529.
132. Id. at 530.
133. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as amended at
52 U.S.C. § 10301).
134. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b), 96 Stat. 131, 131
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303).
135. The Court recently made it much more difficult to prove a violation of Section 2. See Brnovich
v. Ariz. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (2021) (holding that two challenged Arizona
election laws were not enacted with racially discriminatory purposes); § 3, 96 Stat. at 134 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
136. Shelby County, 570 U.S at 561 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
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by a new voting restriction.138 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was adopted
to prevent such actions.139
Section 5 applies to jurisdictions with a history of race discrimination in
voting and requires that there be preapproval—termed “preclearance”—of any
attempt to change “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” in any “covered
jurisdiction.”140 The preapproval must come either from the Attorney General
of the United States, through an administrative procedure in the Department
of Justice, or from a three-judge federal court in the District of Columbia
through a request for a declaratory judgment.141
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,142 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and spoke of the “blight
of racial discrimination in voting.”143 The Court found that Section 5 was a
constitutional exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment’s prohibition of race discrimination in voting.144 Section 4(b) of
the Act determines which jurisdictions are required to get preclearance.145
Congress has repeatedly extended Section 5, including for five years in
1970, seven years in 1975, and twenty-five years in 1982.146 In 1982, Congress
revised the formula in Section 4(b), determining which jurisdictions were
required to obtain preclearance before changing their election systems.147 After
each reauthorization, the Court again upheld the constitutionality of
Sections 4(b) and 5.148
These provisions were scheduled to expire again in 2007.149 In 2005–2006,
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees held twenty-one hearings, listened

138. See Voter Suppression: Election Strategy, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/votersuppression [https://perma.cc/5D3B-HY2E].
139. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 562 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
140. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at
52 U.S.C. § 10304).
141. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 562 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
142. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
143. Id. at 308.
144. Id.
145. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 576.
146. History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 28, 2017), https://www.justice.
gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rights-laws [https://perma.cc/PF6U-GL4K].
147. Id.
148. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 526–27 (1973); City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156, 158 (1980), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, § 2(b), 96 Stat.
131, 131 (codified as amended at 24 U.S.C. § 10303)); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 267
(1999).
149. See History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, supra note 146.
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to ninety witnesses, and compiled a record of over 15,000 pages.150
Representative Sensenbrenner, a Republican from Wisconsin and then-Chair
of the House Judiciary Committee, described this record as “one of the most
extensive considerations of any piece of legislation that the United States
Congress has dealt with in the 27 1/2 years that I have been honored to serve as
a Member of this body.”151
Congress then voted overwhelmingly—98–0 in the Senate and 390–33 in
the House—to extend Section 5 for twenty-five years.152 However, the bill that
passed did not change Section 4(b) or Section 5. Congress expressly concluded
that voting discrimination persists in the covered jurisdictions, and that without
Section 5, “minority citizens will be deprived of the opportunity to exercise
their right to vote, or will have their votes diluted, undermining the significant
gains made by minorities in the last 40 years.”153
Despite this, in Shelby County, the Supreme Court in a five-to-four
decision, declared Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional.154 As
explained above, this is the provision which determines which jurisdictions need
to get preclearance. Without Section 4(b), Section 5 is meaningless; no
jurisdictions need to get preclearance.
Shelby County, Alabama, which is south of Selma, is a jurisdiction located
in a state with a long history of race discrimination in voting. Because of this
history, it is a jurisdiction covered by Section 5 and it challenged the
constitutionality of these provisions of the Voting Rights Act. It lost in both
the district court and the federal court of appeals. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a two-to-one decision, concluded that
Congress found “widespread and persistent racial discrimination in voting in
covered jurisdictions” and that Section 5’s “disparate geographic coverage is
sufficiently related to the problem it targets.”155
But the Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision, held Section 4(b)
unconstitutional and thereby effectively nullified Section 5 because it applied
only to jurisdictions covered under Section 4(b).156 Chief Justice Roberts wrote
for the Court and stressed that the formula in Section 4(b), last modified in

150. Laleh Ispahani, Three Myths About the Voting Rights Act, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS. (Mar. 1, 2013),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/three-myths-about-voting-rights-act [https://perma.
cc/Y2L6-7R5A].
151. 152 CONG. REC. H5143 (daily ed. July 13, 2006) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
152. Carl Hulse, By a Vote of 98-0, Senate Approves 25-Year Extension of Voting Rights Act, N.Y.
TIMES (July 21, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/21/washington/21vote.html [https://perma.
cc/JC5P-K8HV (dark archive)].
153. 154 CONG. REC. H5178 (daily ed. July 13, 2006).
154. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 530 (2013).
155. Shelby County v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 864, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
156. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 530.
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1982, rests on data from the 1960s and 1970s and that race discrimination in
voting has changed since then.157 The Court declared:
Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically. Shelby County
contends that the preclearance requirement, even without regard to its
disparate coverage, is now unconstitutional. Its arguments have a good
deal of force. In the covered jurisdictions, “[v]oter turnout and
registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions
of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at
unprecedented levels.” The tests and devices that blocked access to the
ballot have been forbidden nationwide for over 40 years.158
Thus, “[c]overage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated
practices.”159
The Court stressed the intrusion on the covered states as they could not
exercise the power to choose how to hold elections, but instead “[s]tates must
beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement laws that they
would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own, subject of
course to any injunction in a § 2 action.”160 The Court also emphasized that
Sections 4(b) and 5, by requiring only some states to get preclearance, violated
the principle of equal state sovereignty.161 The Court stated: “Not only do States
retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also a ‘fundamental principle
of equal sovereignty’ among the States. . . . [D]espite the tradition of equal
sovereignty, the Act applies to only nine States (and several additional
counties).”162
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan.163 The dissent stressed that race discrimination in voting remains and
was documented by Congress.164 The dissent argued that the Court should be
deferential to this judgment and the exercise of power by Congress.165
There is no doubt that the invalidation of preclearance has had an effect
on voting rights. States put into effect laws that had been denied preclearance
and have continued to adopt laws restricting voting that will have a racially
disparate effect. In the most recent case, Brnovich v. Democratic National
Committee,166 Justice Kagan noted,

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 531.
Id. at 547 (citation omitted).
Id. at 551.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 544–45.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 576–80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021).
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Although causation is hard to establish definitively, those post Shelby
County changes appear to have reduced minority participation in the next
election cycle. The most comprehensive study available found that in
areas freed from Section 5 review, white turnout remained the same, but
“minority participation dropped by 2.1 percentage points”—a stark
reversal in direction from prior elections. The results, said the scholar
who crunched the numbers, “provide early evidence that the Shelby
ruling may jeopardize decades of voting rights progress.”167
All of this explains why the Supreme Court has a poor record on issues of
race throughout its history. The crucial question is whether it is likely to be any
better in the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, with the makeup of the current
Court it appears the poor record on racial issues will only continue in the future.
II. WHAT NOW FROM THE SUPREME COURT?
Having painted a bleak picture of the past, I fear it is going to get worse
with the six conservative justices on the current Court. This part hypothesizes
what we might expect in the foreseeable future from the Supreme Court
regarding issues of race.
A.

Narrow Interpretation of Civil Rights Laws

First, I foresee a narrow interpretation of civil rights laws. For example,
consider the Supreme Court’s decision a year ago in Comcast v. National Ass’n of
African American-Owned Media.168 At the outset, I should disclose that I was the
losing attorney in the Supreme Court, having argued for the National
Association of African American Owned Media.
Byron Allen is a businessman, performer, and owner of many cable
channels, including the Weather Channel. The Comcast litigation involved
seven channels that he owns. They are carried on most cable and satellite
services, such as Verizon FIOS, AT&T U-verse and DirecTV. Comcast and
Charter Communications, though, do not carry these channels.
Allen alleged that his company, Entertainment Studios, went to both
Comcast and Charter Communications and was told the steps necessary for
carriage. He claimed that he spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to meet
these requirements, only to be told that the cable companies had no bandwidth
for his channels. Allen alleged that each of the companies nonetheless added
dozens of channels owned by white individuals. Allen’s complaint alleged that
a Comcast executive candidly told Entertainment Studios why it refused to
contract: “We’re not trying to create any more Bob Johnsons.” Bob Johnson is

167. Id. at 2355 n.2 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
168. 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020).
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the African American founder of Black Entertainment Television (“BET”), a
groundbreaking network that was eventually sold to Viacom for $3 billion.
Allen sued Comcast and Charter Communications pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, which prohibits race discrimination in contracting. Adopted as part of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”169
Although the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Allen, the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed and remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit.170
Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote for the Court. The Court held that a plaintiff must
allege and prove but-for causation in order to prevail in a suit under § 1981,
declaring: “It is ‘textbook tort law’ that a plaintiff seeking redress for a
defendant’s legal wrong typically must prove but-for causation. . . . Under this
standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate that, but for the defendant’s unlawful
conduct, its alleged injury would not have occurred.”171 The Court said that
nothing in the statutory language or history of § 1981 provides a basis for
concluding that other than but-for causation is required.
The Court was explicit that this causation requirement must be met at the
pleading stage, as well as ultimately at summary judgment or trial: “Here, a
plaintiff bears the burden of showing that race was a but-for cause of its injury.
And, while the materials the plaintiff can rely on to show causation may change
as a lawsuit progresses from filing to judgment, the burden itself remains
constant.”172
Most importantly, the Court’s decision means for § 1981—and for that
matter all federal civil rights laws that do not have specific language to the
contrary—that but-for causation must be alleged and proved. Previously, the
Supreme Court required but-for causation only for statutes that use words such
as “because,” “because of,” or “based on.” For example, in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc.,173 the Court said that but-for causation was required for disparate
treatment claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act because the
statute prohibits discrimination “because of such individual’s age.”174 The Court
said, “The words ‘because of’ mean ‘by reason of: on account of.’ . . . Thus, the
ordinary meaning of the ADEA’s requirement that an employer took adverse
action ‘because of’ age is that age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to
act.”175
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1011–12.
Id. at 1014 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1014–15.
557 U.S. 167 (2009).
Id. at 176.
Id.
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However, prior to Comcast, the Court never held that all civil rights laws
are interpreted to require but-for causation unless the text specifies otherwise.
Proving but-for causation is undoubtedly a much harder standard to meet than
showing that race is a “motivating factor.” A simple example is illustrative.
Imagine a person goes to a hotel to rent a room and the desk clerk says: “Sorry
we have no availability. Besides we don’t rent to Black people.” If it is enough
to allege that race is a motivating factor, those facts would be enough to
withstand a motion to dismiss, allowing the case to proceed to discovery and,
ultimately, to summary judgment or trial. But if race must be the but-for cause
of the denial of the contract, the plaintiff cannot withstand a motion to dismiss
on these facts. Under the but-for test, it is likely that many potentially
meritorious claims will be dismissed at the pleading stage.
B.

Ending Affirmative Action

Second, in the near future, I fear that we will see the end of affirmative
action. Are there five possible votes on the Court to reaffirm Bakke, Grutter, and
Fisher? I think there are now likely six votes on the Court—Roberts, Thomas,
Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett—who will say that Bakke, Grutter, and
Fisher were wrongly decided. I hope I am wrong. I believe that affirmative
action is crucial to remedying past discrimination and achieving diversity, but I
do not see any indication from anything these six Justices have ever said or
written that they would vote to uphold affirmative action programs.
My hope was that the Supreme Court would not take the affirmative
action case involving Harvard University.176 But since the Court has taken the
case, I fear for the end of affirmative action by colleges and universities. It is
simply impossible to count five votes on the current Supreme Court to uphold
affirmative action programs. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and
Alito have repeatedly urged the end of all race-conscious programs to benefit
people of color.177 There seems little doubt as to how the three conservative
Trump appointees—Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett—will vote on
this.

176. See Students for Fair Admissions v. President of Harv. Coll., 980 F.3d 157, 204 (1st Cir.
2020) (holding that “Harvard did not intentionally discriminate against Asian Americans”). On
January 24, 2022, the Court granted certiorari in both the Harvard and University of North Carolina
affirmative action cases. Order Granting Petition for Certiorari in Students for Fair Admissions v.
Harvard, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2021) (mem.); Order Granting Petition for Certiorari in Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 142 S. Ct. 896 (2022).
177. See, e.g., Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2221 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[D]istinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people.” (quoting Rice
v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000))); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 315 (2013)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[A] State’s use of race in higher education admissions decisions is
categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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Threatening Disparate Impact Liability

Third, statutes that allow for disparate impact liability are at risk under
the current Supreme Court. As explained earlier, the Supreme Court has held
that for equal protection, disparate impact is not sufficient to prove a racial
classification. But the Court has held that statutes can allow for disparate impact
liability. In 1971, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,178 the Supreme Court held that
disparate impact is sufficient under Title VII with regard to employment
discrimination.179 In 2015, in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs
v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,180 the Supreme Court held in a five-to-four
decision that disparate impact liability is permissible under the Fair Housing
Act of 1968.181 It is far easier to prove disparate impact than it is to show a
discriminatory intent. Rarely do government officials express a racially
discriminatory reason for their actions. But I worry that the conservative
Justices on the Court might go so far in the future as to say that disparate impact
liability denies equal protection. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, in Ricci
v. DeStefano182 outlined this.183 He said disparate impact liability requires that
decision makers take account of race in order to avoid liability. He said for the
government to require decision-makers to take account of race is inconsistent
with the Constitution, which he believes requires color blindness. I am
concerned that with the current conservative majority on the Court this view
poses a real threat to disparate impact liability under statutes.184
Notably, the current conservative Court is likely to last a long time. At the
time she was confirmed, Amy Coney Barrett was forty-eight years old. If she
remains on the Court until she is eighty-seven—the age at which Justice
Ginsburg died—Barrett will be a justice until the year 2059. At the time of
Barrett’s confirmation, Neil Gorsuch was fifty-three, Brett Kavanaugh fiftyfive, John Roberts sixty-five, Samuel Alito seventy, and Clarence Thomas
seventy-two. I have long thought that the best predictor of a long lifespan is
being confirmed for a seat on the Supreme Court. Justice Stevens did not retire
until he was ninety years old. So, it is possible to imagine that five or six of
these justices will be together for another decade or two.
178. 401 U.S. 424.
179. Id. at 424.
180. 576 U.S. 519.
181. Id. at 2510.
182. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
183. Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring).
184. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs., 576 U.S. at 547–57 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Fair Housing Act does not support disparate impact liability); Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594–96 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often
requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on
(because of) those racial outcomes. That type of racial decisionmaking is, as the Court explains,
discriminatory.”).
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III. WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO ACHIEVE RACIAL JUSTICE?
Parts I and II admittedly painted a very depressing picture about the
Supreme Court and race. I cannot find any basis for optimism for the
foreseeable future. But there are other paths to achieve racial justice, not
focusing on the Supreme Court or the federal judiciary.
A.

Other Institutions

Institutions of all sorts and levels of government can work to achieve
diversity and remedy discrimination. At the institutional level, it will still be
possible to continue to pursue diversity, even if the Supreme Court overrules
Bakke and Grutter and Fisher. I can speak here from experience, having been part
of the University of California system for the last thirteen years. In 1996,
California voters adopted an initiative commonly referred to as Proposition
209, that ended affirmative action in the state. The initiative said that state and
local governments cannot discriminate or give preference on the basis of race or
sex in education, contracting or employment.
Initially, this had a devastating effect on diversity at schools such as UCLA
and Berkeley. The statistics are stunning in terms of the precipitous drop in
Black and Latinx students. But over time, schools like UCLA and Berkeley have
discovered ways to achieve diversity consistent with the end of affirmative
action. At Berkeley Law, for example, fifty percent of the students are students
of color. In the time that I have been Dean at Berkeley Law, we have increased
from twelve African American students in the first-year class to twenty-eight
African American students to thirty-three, to this year having forty-three
African American students in our first-year class. We have done this completely
consistently with the decisions of the California Supreme Court and
Proposition 209. We accomplished this, in large part, through outreach and
communications after students have been accepted. We did not change our
admissions standards in any way, but we did engage in much more aggressive
efforts to encourage accepted students to come.
UCLA and other UC schools have done this as well. California is not the
only state where these initiatives prohibiting affirmative action have been
implemented. Schools in these states also have found ways to achieve diversity
consistent with the law.185 So, the overruling of Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher need

185. See Halley Potter, What Can We Learn from States That Ban Affirmative Action?, CENTURY
FOUND. (June 26, 2014), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/what-can-we-learn-from-states-thatban-affirmative-action/?session=1&session=1 [https://perma.cc/D897-S4GK] (examining how schools
in states where affirmative action is prohibited are promoting diversity). See generally WILLIAM C.
KIDDER & PATRICIA GÁNDARA, TWO DECADES AFTER THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BAN:
EVALUATING THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA’S RACE-NEUTRAL EFFORTS (Oct. 2015), https://
www.ets.org/Media/Research/pdf/kidder_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZLD-Q9LP] (examining a
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not mean the end of diversity and the end of remedies for discrimination. My
great fear is that overruling these cases will have an immediate adverse
consequence, as occurred in California. I worry also that it will let
administrators who do not really care about diversity and remedying racial
inequalities to throw up their hands and say there is nothing they can do.
Nevertheless, a difference must be made at the institutional level, no matter
what the Supreme Court decides.
B.

Looking to the States

Second, we must increasingly turn to state courts and state constitutions.
In 1977, Justice William Brennan wrote a famous article in the Harvard Law
Review encouraging the use of state constitutions to protect constitutional
rights.186 Brennan argued that state constitutions “are a font of individual
liberties.”187 In part, this was a former state supreme court justice—Brennan had
been a justice on the New Jersey Supreme Court—extolling the virtues of state
courts and state constitutions. But it was more than that. By 1977, Brennan had
seen the retrenchment of constitutional rights by the Burger Court, especially
in the area of criminal procedure. His frustration was palpable in seeing Warren
Court precedents narrowed and sometimes overruled. Brennan urged the use
of state constitutions as an alternative in light of the failures of the Supreme
Court in protecting federal constitutional rights.
Justice Brennan could not foresee how long this trend would last or how
conservative the Court would become, but he urged an alternative in turning to
the state constitutions and state courts. We must do this in numerous areas to
achieve racial justice, and there are plenty of areas where it has worked.
Marriage equality is a stunning example of this. In the Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health188 decision in 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court found that it violated the Massachusetts Constitution to keep
gay people from marrying.189 This is an example of how lawyers responsible for
the strategy to create the right of marriage equality for gays and lesbians wisely
began in state courts challenging state constitutions. They did not bring any
federal claims because had they done so, the case could be removed from state
to federal court. They filed only claims under state constitutions.

case study of the efforts and outcomes of the race-neutral alternatives developed and implemented by
the University of California in the “wake of the loss of affirmative action”).
186. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 489 (1977). For an excellent recent advocacy of the development of state constitutional law
see JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 82–83 (2018).
187. Brennan, supra note 186, at 491.
188. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.).
189. Id. at 969.
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Litigation then ensued in other states. It failed in New York.190 It
succeeded in Iowa.191 It succeeded in California.192 There were initiatives and
momentum built. Had this gone to the Supreme Court in 2003, there is no way
that the Supreme Court would have found a right to marriage equality. But this
strategy, beginning with state courts and state constitutions, meant that within
a dozen years, in 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges,193 the Supreme Court could find
a federal constitutional right to marriage equality everywhere in the country.194
Or as another example, just a few years ago, the Washington State
Supreme Court found that the state death penalty violated the state
constitution.195 The Washington Supreme Court’s decision focused on the racial
disparities with regard to the administration of the death penalty.
Another example here concerns policing. Many state supreme courts have
found that certain police conduct violates state constitutions even where the
Supreme Court has held that it does not offend the U.S. Constitution. As
discussed earlier, Whren is one of the Supreme Court decisions that has most
expanded the power of the police to stop almost anyone at any time. The Court
held that the motivations of an officer are irrelevant in evaluating the legality
of a stop or a frisk or a search. An officer can use a minor traffic violation—
driving through a yellow light, changing lanes without a signal, not stopping
long enough at a stop sign—as a pretext for the police easily to engage in racial
profiling. But several state supreme courts have rejected Whren and held that
pretextual stops violate their state constitutions.196 They have expressly
repudiated the Supreme Court’s approach and taken the opposite approach.
C.

Legislative Action

A third avenue for change is state and federal legislation. Congress, state
legislators, and local city councils can do so much to advance racial justice.
Congress can adopt federal civil rights laws to fix bad decisions like that in
Comcast. Congress can amend federal civil rights statutes to say that it is
sufficient to show that race is a motivating factor and that but-for causation is
not required. Congress, and for that matter state legislatures, can expand the
ability to find violations based on disparate impact liability. Unless and until
the Supreme Court says it is not allowed, statutes can create disparate impact
liability and they need to do so. Congress needs to reform the voting and the
190. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 22 (N.Y. 2006), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576
U.S. 644 (2015).
191. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009).
192. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008).
193. 576 U.S. 644.
194. Id. at 681.
195. State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 627 (Wash. 2018).
196. See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Ark. 2002); State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833,
842 (Wash. 1999).
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political process, including adopting legislation to overcome Shelby County and
reinstitute a form of preclearance when a jurisdiction with a history of race
discrimination changes its election systems.
Congress and state legislators can do so much to reform and change
policing in the United States. They can outlaw practices like the use of the
chokehold, racial profiling, and no-knock warrants that lead to abuses and
deaths. Congress by statute can change the standard of qualified immunity,
which has provided protection for so many police officers who engage in
excessive force, including that which leads to death. Congress can expand
liability of local governments to give them the incentive to oversee policing and
make a change. After the death of George Floyd and the national protests about
police violence, I was optimistic that Congress would act. A bill to reform
policing passed in the House but stalled in the Senate. I am skeptical as to
whether such a law can be enacted until there are other catastrophic events
attracting national attention or a change in the composition of Congress.
The protests for racial justice in every one of the fifty states represent an
impetus for this reform, and it is our responsibility to continue that pressure.
CONCLUSION
Though this Article paints a bleak picture with regard to the Supreme
Court, there can be tremendous advances for racial justice through other
avenues, such as the ones discussed in Part III. If these other avenues for change
are used, there is enormous hope and optimism for the future.
Over the course of American history, there have been tremendous
advances in our society with regard to equality and liberty. There, of course, is
tremendous work to be done to solve the great racial inequities that remain in
American society. But no one can deny that there has been progress. I was born
in 1953 at a time when every southern state was segregated by law. There is an
enormous way to go with regard to progress in terms of sex equality, but there
has certainly been great progress in all of our lives. With regard to sexual
orientation, it was just six years ago that the Supreme Court held that state laws
prohibiting same-sex marriage violate equal protection and deny due process.
There also has been a tremendous growth in individual freedom over the course
of American history.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. got it exactly right when he said, “The arc of
the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.”197

197. Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Commencement Address for Oberlin College (June 1965),
in OBERLIN COLL. ARCHIVES, https://www2.oberlin.edu/external/EOG/BlackHistoryMonth/MLK/
CommAddress.html [https://perma.cc/3FHR-FUQZ].
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